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WhileWhile itit isis byby nono meansmeans clearclear whetherwhether wewe 
shouldshould speakspeak ofof animalsanimals asas rights-bearers,rights-bearers, inin 
anyany literalliteral sense,sense, oror simplysimply asas creaturescreatures toto 
whomwhom wewe havehave certaincertain responsibilities,responsibilities, itit isis 
arereasonablyreasonably clearclear thatthat animalsanimals are properproper ob­ob­2jectsjects ofof moralmoral concern.concern. 2 GrantingGranting animalsanimals 
moralmoral standing,standing, however,however, needneed notnot resultresult inin 
attemptsattempts toto promotepromote animalanimal welfare.welfare. ImagineImagine 
yourselfyourself in thethe followingfollowing situation.situation. YouYou arein are 
biochemist,bioche ist, isolatedisolated on a desertdesert islandisland withithon a 
youryour daughterdaughter Jill,Jill, youryour petpet dogdog PhiloPhilo andand aa 
smalls all butbut well-equippedell-equipped laboratory.laboratory. OneOne dayday 
youryour daughtdaught fallsfalls ill;ill; herher healthhealth failsfails rap­rap­
idlyidly andand itit seemssee s evidentevident sheshe willill diedie unlessunless 
somethingso ething isis done.done. Youou synthesizesynthesize whathat mayay 
aa curecure butbut youyou areare notnot sure;sure; itit mayay alsoalso 
aa poison.poison. Whathat shouldshould youyou do?do? Thehe ob­ob­
viousvious answerans er isis thatt at youyou testtest thethe potionpotion onon 
Philo.Philo. ToTo dodo otherwiseother ise wouldould bebe morallyorally un­un­
justifiable.j stifi l . 33 Thehe factf t thatt t youyou testt st thet e 
possiblessi le curecure onon Philohilo doesdoes notnot showsho  thatt at 
youyou dodo notnot carecare aboutabout himhi  orr taketake himhi  toto bebe 
properproper objectobject ofof moraloral concern.concern. ItIt isis justjust 
thatt at ini  thist is casecase Philo'sil 's interestsi terests areare out­t­
weighedi  by Jill's.'  
Conflictsonflicts likeli e thethe aboveabove demonstratede onstrate thatt at 
moraloral concernconcern isis notnot aa sufficients fficie t guideguide forfor 
ourour treatmenttreat ent ofof animals.ani als. Donaldonald VanDeVeeran e eer 
hass ~osedpps  thet  problemr l  well:ll: 
troublesometroubleso e .and.and difficultiffic lt questionTheThe question� 
whichhich arises,arises, onceonce oneone isis convincedconvinced that�t at 
bothboth humanhu an beingsbeings (or(or many)any) andand animalsani als� 
(or(or many)any) havehave atat leastleast someso e morallyorally� 
relevantrele a t interests,i terests, concernsconcerns howho  toto� 
~ theirt eir respectiveres ecti e interestsi terests ini  gen­
eral and howho  to adjudicateadjudicate conflictsconflicts of 
wei~h gen­� ~ nd to of� 
and�interesti terest whichhich arisearise betweenbet een humanshu ans and 
animals.ani als.4�4 . 
Whathat needsneeds to bebe shownsho n isis howhow moraloral concernconcern 
oughtought toto bebe manifestanifest withith respectrespect toto animals.ani als. 
~ot~ot eveneven thethe establishmentestablish ent ofof animalanimal rights,rights, 
veryvery strongstrong conclusion,conclusion, wouldwould resolveresolve thisthis 
to 
problem.problem. If animalanimal interestsinterests are protectedprotected 
byby rights,rights, we stillstill mustmust askask to whatwhat extent,extent, 
If are 
we to 
areif any,any, theythey are protectedprotected againstagainst humanhuman 
interests.interests.5S 
Ajustjust resolutionresolution of thethe aboveabove problemproblem w~llA of will 
havehave to taketake accountaccount of bothboth similaritiessimilarities andto of and 
differencesdifferences betweenhumanshumans and animals.animals. RecentRecentbetW'een and 
studiesstudies of animalanimal behaviorbehavior havehave shownshown thatthat be­of be­
haviorhavior to be significantlysignificantly more complexcomplexand,and,to be more 
more toconsequently,consequently, more similarsimilar to humanhumanbehaviorbehavior 
thanthanpreviouslypreviouslyassumed.assumed.66 AmongAmongotherother things,things, 
to useanimalsanimalshavehavebeenbeen foundfound to usecomplicatedcomplicated 
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communication systems and to modify objects 
~or use as tools, two activities once deemed 
the exclusive property of human beings. Such 
sophisticated behavior has led a number of 
sciencists to conclude that at least some ani­
mals have a fairly substantial mental life.' 
Needless to say, this conclusion has marked 
implications for the weighing of animal in­
terests. An animal with a high level of 
awareness is vulnerable in more ways than one 
wich a low level and, consequently, places a 
greater demand on our moral consideration. 
Excitement over these discoveries, however, 
should not lead us to forget the remaining, 
significant differences between animal and 
human behavior. Recently discovered similar­
i:ies, significant though they be, are not 
great enough to bridge that divide. Nor is 
it likely that future research will do so. 
Barring the discovery of presently unknown 
life-forms, human uniqueness appears a fact 
to be lived with. To those concerned about 
animal welfare such a conclusion may seem un­
:ortunate and even distressing. Tradition­
ally, human uniqueness has been taken to 
justify a rather cavalier attitude toward 
animal welfare. Whether one spoke of souls, 
minds, intrinsic value, or divine commands, 
the well-being of animals was felt to be in­
significant compared to that of human beings. 
The result is well-known: the most trivial 
of human interests allows the most thorough 
disregard for animal interests. It is no 
wonder, then, that advocates of animal wel­
fare have preferred to emphasize similari­
:1es while downplaying differences between 
animal and human behavior. 
In what follows, I want to re-examine the 
role of human uniqueness in adjudicating con­
flicts between animal and human interests. 
~~ conclusion will be that for the most part 
t~is role has been misunderstood. Properly 
understood, human uniqueness is a vital com­
ponent in the case for animal welfare. My 
argument ~ill proceed in two stages. To be­
oin I will sketch a princi­system of moral o , . 
ples for adjudicating conflicts between an~-
mal and human interests. Iftlile grancing some 
Doral consideration to animal interests, 
these principles both recognize human unique­
ness and grant high priority to human inter­
ests. Having outlined this system, I will 
use it to address questions regarding the 
morality of animal experimentation. After 
distinguishing two distinct ways in which 
[he systen can be applied to such questions, 
I will argue that resolution of the debate 
over animal experimentation depends to a 
large extent on fundamental assumptions about 
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human nature. It is here that human unique­
ness lends a hand to animal welfare. 
I 
What needs to be shown with respect to ani­
mals is not only that their welfare i$ ~
matter of moral concern but equally important 
how much weight animal interests ought to 
carry whenever they conflict with human in­
terests. One plausible approach to this 
problem has been labeled by VanDeVeer "two­
factor egalitarianism."a As its name sug­
gests, two-factor egalitarianism focuses on 
two factors: these are. extent of interest 
and psychological complexity. Once these are 
determined, various principles inform the 
moral agent how much weight each deserves, 
allowing in general that significance varies 
directly with extent of interest and degree 
of psychological compleXity. Such a system 
has intuitive appeal. 9 By focusing on the 
extent of interest involved two-factor egali­
tarianism allows us to take into account rela­
tive cost and benefit. Underlying each de­
cision will be a cost-benefit analysis. At 
the same time, two-factor egalitarianism as­
cribes greater weight to the interests of our 
own kind, a position many persons find morally 
appealing. Moreover, it does so on the non­
discriminatory, or, egalitarian grounds of 
psychological complexity. All this is not to 
sav there are no problems regarding the 
ac~eptability of two-factor egalitarianism as 
a guide to moral deliberation. 1Q For purposes 
of this paper, however, I will ignore what­
ever difficulties there may be and work with­
in the framework provided by two-factor egal­
itarianism. My intention is to sketch a some­
what plausible system in terms of which the 
role of human uniqueness can be evaluated, 
not to argue that two-factor egalitarianism 
provides an adequate context for resolving 
conflicts between animal and human interests. 
Let me begin with extent of interest. 
A continuum of interests is not difficult 
to envision. With respect to myself, I know 
that some things count more for my well-being 
than others .. The extent of this counting is, 
of course, not a matter of my apprehension 
alone; it is a reflection of the world and my 
place therein. In many cases, I am aware of 
and correctly apprehend the relative impor­
tance of my interests. In other cases, I do 
not. Unlike normal, adult humans, the knowl­
edge animals have of their own L~terests will 
be extremely vague or entirely intuitive. 11 
On our part, the determination and weighing 
of animal interests requires careful, pro­
longed observation, with special care taken 
to avoid anthropomorphic distortions. Recent 
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studies of wolves, chimpanzees and gorillas 
indicate that such distortions can be avoided 
and animal interests assessed from an objec­
tive, scientific standpoint. 12 
Interests, both human and animal, can be di­
vided up in several ways. For purposes of 
this paper, I want to distinguish between 
three levels of importance, which I call 
'basic,' 'serious' and 'peripheral. '13 Per­
ipheral interests are goods the absence of 
which results in some loss but whose presence 
is not essential to well-being. In this 
sense, satisfactions of peripheral interests 
are luxuries, pleasures that could be done 
without. Basic interests lie at the other 
extreme of the continuum. A basic interest 
is a good, the absence of which results 
either in death or a life not worth living. 
For purposes of convenience, let me refer to 
a basic interest whose frustration results 
in death as a Bl-interest. A basic interest 
whose frustration results in a life not worth 
living I will refer to as a B2-interest. An 
example of a B2-interest is the absence of 
intense, prolonged suffering. An example of 
a Bi-interest is food, the consumption of 
which is necessary for life. 
Serious interests lie near the middle of 
the continuum. IJhile counting heavily to­
ward the quality of existence, they are not 
so basic that their frustration results in 
death or an intolerable life. w~at their 
frustration results in is, quite simply, a 
bad life. What makes a life good or bad 
will vary from kind to kind, as well as from 
individual to individual. For our purposes, 
we can regard a life as bad if a significant 
number of natural tendencies are frustrated. 
A bad life is a life without fulfillment. 
An example of a serious interest for wolves 
is membership in a pack. A solitary wolf 
lacks opportunity to satisfy its strong 
social instincts. An example of a serious 
interest for human beings (as well as many 
animals) is being loved or appreciated by 
others of their kind. While life may not 
cease to be worth living without such ful­
fillment, it is hard to imagine a truly 
happy person whose life is empty of affec­
tion. 
Just as interests lie on a continuum with 
respect to importance, so animals and humans 
lie on a continuum with respect to psycho­
logical complexity. At one end of this con­
tinuum are beings barely sentient, having no 
more than a primitive capacity to feel pain 
or pleasure. Here, the organism's drive for 
homeostasis has become externalized in a non­
9

 
reflective awareness. The value of such aware­
ness, limited as it is~· is that it allows for 
greater adaptability: a painful course will be 
avoided, a pleasurable one pursued. In this 
way bare awareness of pain and pleasure allows 
an organism to unthinkingly anticipate the 
future and react accordingly. One characteris­
tic of non-reflective awareness is that pat­
terns of response must be built into the organ­
ism, a product of evolutionary selection. 
At Some point on the continuum, bare aware­
ness of pain and pleasure is filled out with a 
capacity to learn from experience, resulting 
in more flexible patterns of behavior. Closed 
instincts, a matter of rigid, genetic program­
ming, become supplemented and, in some cases, 
supplanted by open instincts. Unlike closed 
instincts, open instincts specify general 
patterns of response, leaving details to be 
filled in by individual and communal exper­
ience. Internally, animals which can learn 
from experience will have more highly develop­
ed nervous systems. Externally, animals which 
can learn from experience will tend to be 
social anirnals. 14 There are good reasons for 
this. Whether limited or prolonged, the 
effect of communal life is to shield individ­
ual animals from deficiencies in their own 
experience and/or capacities: the community 
as a whole provides an ongoing reservoir of 
adaptive response. Utilization of this res­
ervoir requires highly developed means of 
communication. Accordingly, animals with a 
capacity to learn will have significant 
capacities for expression, whether in the 
form of gesture, sound, posture, or facial 
expression. 
Associated with plasticity of behavior is 
the haVing of a unified life. For animals 
near the bottom of the continuum, life is no 
more than a series of discrete experiences, 
some good, other bad. With increasing psy­
chological complexity it beComes necessary 
that life be unified over time not only in a 
biological but also in. a "biographical" 
sense. Past, present and future are thereby 
b()und together in a way previously unknown. 
The past remains present in memory and ca­
pacity while the future anticipates itself 
in long and short term goals. One measure 
of the extent to which life becomes an 
animal's own in more than a numer~cal sense 
is the development of indiVidual personal­
ities. For our purposes,· we can think of 
personality as "unified complexity." Not 
only is the behavior of animals having a 
life in the biographical sense complex, it 
is also unified in a distinctive manner. is 
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It is not hard to run the continuum on from 
here. In human beings we see a much greater 
capacity to learn, brought about by neurologi­
cal and social changes. Closed instincts 
have receded further while open instincts 
have become even more open. Along with human 
culture and language has come increased indi­
viduality. Most important, humans have ac­
quired the capacity to conceptualize their 
lives as wholes and, subsequently, direct them 
according to rational and moral norms. Here, 
awareness becomes fully reflective. Although 
recent studies indicate that some primates 
other than man are self-conscious--at least 
to the extent that they can identify them­
selves in mirrors and pictures--there is good 
reason to believe their conceptual abilities 
quite limited and virtually no reason to re­
gard them as moral agents. So far, human be­
ings stand alone at their end of the continuum. 
I will call animals which are barely sentient 
"level-I beings." Such beings have no more 
than a primitive capacity to feel pain and 
pleasure. Animals which have a life in the 
biogrpphical sense, I will refer to as "level­
II beings." The increasing complexity of 
these animals allows their lives to be unified 
over time in ways not previously possible. 
Humans and whatever other beings have the ca­
pacity to direct the lives they have in accord 
with rational and moral norms, 1 will refer to 
as "level-III beings." Here, personality 
reaches its fulfillment in agency, made poss­
ible by the apprehension of external standards 
for behavior. Combining these three levels of 
psychological complexity with our four kinds 
of interests, we can now demarcate twelve, dis­
tinct categories of interests. These are 
listed in the follOWing table: 
cacegories of interest 
S-interestsBl-interests 
III Slevel-III beings 
II Slevel-II beings 
I Slevel-I beings 
Each interest involved in a conflict can be 
placed, more-or-less determinately, in one of 
these categories. What are needed now are 
principles ranking these categories with re­
spect to moral significance. 
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One way to proceed at this point would be 
to raise a general question regarding guide­
lines for moral judgment. Granted that we 
need "ranking principles," how are we to 
decide what is and what is not an acceptable 
principle? While this is an important issue 
which must eventually be ~aced, I am going to 
sidestep it for purposes of this paper. Rather 
than raising a general question about the 
nature of morality, I will present six prin­
ciples for adjudicating conflicts between 
animal and human interests. Which, if any, 
of these principles are morally justifiable 
I will leave, in this paper, to the reader's 
judgment. My purpose in presenting these 
six principles is to outline a mininal, non­
speciesistic system with respect to animal 
welfare. In order to distinguish this sys­
tem from other systems falling under the 
rubric of two-factor egalitarianism I will 
call it "the c-system." The c-system is a 
minimal system with respect to animal wel­
fare because in every kind of conflict save 
one priority is granted to the interests of 
higher beings. The c-system is non-species­
istic in that it does not grant special sta­
tus to humans simply on the grounds that 
they are human. The source of human pri­
ority lies in human capacity. An animal 
belonging to level-III would deserve greater 
consideration than a human belonging to 
level-II. It is in this sense that the c­
system is an egalitarian system. 
The first three principles are common to 
all systems falling under the rubric of two­
factor egalitarianism. These are the left­
right, the top-bottom and the cross-over 
principle. The left-right principle concerns 
P-interests 
III P 
II P 
I P 
interests in a particular row. that is, in­
terests of the same level of beings. It 
reads. 
leaving aside between
the difference  
Bl and BZ interests and with­

staying 
in a given row, interests trump, i.e.,

 
take moral precedence, from to

left  
right.
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(In a moment, we will consider 'the relative 
weight of BI and Bz interests.) The top­
bottom principle concerns interests in a 
given column, that is, similar interests 
held by beings of different levels. It 
reads, 
within each column interests trumplfrom top to bottom. 6 
The cross-over principle is needed for com­

pleteness. reads,

It  
trumps are transitive. 
Together the left-right, top-bottom and 
cross-over principles resolve numerous con­
flicts. Apart from the difference between 
BI and B2 interests, they handle e~ery con­
flict going down and/or to the rignt on our 
table of interests. The remaining three prin­
ciples deal with cases "cutting against the 
"rain " that is where the lesser interests of 
higher beings trump the of
 
0' ,
 
greater interests  
lower beings, or conversely, in­
the greater 
terests of lower beings trump in­
the lesser 
terests of higher beings. These prin­

three 
ciples are the BI ' SB and B2 principles. The

 
BI reads,

principle  
a P interest of a level-III being trumps 
a BI interest of a level-lor level-II 
being. 
This controversial principle tells uS that 
(normal) humans are justified in killing (nor­
mal) animals for the sake of any interest 
whatever. 17 
The last two principles concern the extent 
to which animals ought to suffer for the sake 
of human interests. In stating them as well 
as the BI principle, I am proceeding on the 
assumntion that animals have a stronger in­
terest in avoiding extreme suffering than in 
staying alive. IS According to the SB prin­
ciple, 
the S interests of level-III beings trump 
the B2 interests of level-I and level-II 
beings while the P interests of level-III 
beings trump the 5 interests of level-I 
and level-II beings. 
The SB principle allows you to inflict any 
amount of suffering on an animal for the sake 
of human fulfillment. It also allows you to 
sacrifice the wellbeing of an animal for the 
sake of any interest whatever. 
The only principle contained in the c-sys­
tem which rules in favor of animal interest 
is the B2 principle. The B2 principle reads, 
11

 
t:he B., interests of level-I and level­
II befngs trump the P interests of 
level-III beings. 
According to the BZ principle, it is wrong to 
make the life of any animal unbearably hor­
rible, that is, so bad that the animal is 
better off dead, for the sake of peripheral 
interests. To reject this principle would in 
effect be to disregard animal interests all 
together. 
II 
Together the left-right, top-bottom, cross­
over, BI, SB and B2 principles define the c­
svstem. As noted, the c-system is a minimal 
system with respect to animal welfare. Given 
the nature of this system it might well be 
expected to justify in a rather straightfor­
wat'd manner present practices involving ani­
mal suffering. What I hope to show in the 
following is that this is an illusion. Even 
a system granting minimal standing to ani­
mals may impose forceful restrictions on 
the way in which and the extent to which 
animals can justifiably be made to suffer 
or die. In order to show this I want to 
concentrate not on highly questionable 
practices, such as the use of rabbits for 
cosmetic testing or the raising of veal 
calves in small, wooden crates, but rather 
on a practice which most people feel is 
justified even if unfortunate, namely, the 
use of animals in scientific experimenta­
tion. What I want to argue is that even 
on the c-system there are serious questions 
about the justifiability of this practice. 
1.et me begin by narrowing down my focus 
of interest. A striking characteristic of 
the use of animals in science is its great 
diversity. One problem with the old debate 
between "vivisectors and antivivisection­
ists" is that it radically oversimplifies 
the issues involved. Animals are used in 
many different ways in science; they are 
not just "cut up." Accordingly, the extent 
to which animal interests are sacrificed 
varies widely. On the one hand, field 
studies such as those of Goodall and 
Schaller need not involve any serious dis­
ruption of animal interests. On the other 
hand, studies such as the well-known depri­
vation experiments of Harry Harlow and 
colleagues involve an extreme sacrifice of 
animal interest. Most situations involving 
the use of animals in science lie somewhere 
between these two extremes. In this paper 
my concern is with those sign1­cases where 
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ficant suffering is inflicted on an animal. 
That there are numerous cases ~here what we 
have called B2 and S interests are sacri­
ficed is clear. The person who doubts this 
need only refer to the relevant literature. 
19 Simply calling attention to these in­
stances of significant suffering, of course, 
is not to pass judgment on them either pro 
or con. The question of justification is 
one to which we now turn. 
According to the c-system we are justi­
fied in inflicting significant suffering 
on an animal so long as that suffering is 
necessary for the satisfaction of signi­
ficant human interests. Such a view has at 
present a wide constituency. Animal advo­
cates work to eliminate instances of unnec­
essary suffering. Scientists themselves 
are trying increasingly hard to eradicate 
instances of superfluous suffering, whether 
these stem from poor experimental design, 
sloppy technique or inadequate housing and 
care. 20 Granted though that so many agree 
that no more suffering should be inflicted 
than necessary, why is it that scientists 
and animal advocates often disagree about 
what is and what is not necessary suffering? 
This is especially puzzling in light of the 
apparent fact that in cases such as that in­
volving Jill and Philo almost everyone will 
agree that the animal's interests ought to 
be sacrificed. Of course, part of the reason 
may be that some animal advocates are unin­
formed sentimentalists or even that some 
scientists allow egoistic desires for publi­
cation and public esteem to interfere with 
their moral judgment. Be this as it may, a 
deeper source of disagreement lies in the use 
by scientists and their critics of two radi­
cally different ideals concerning how super­
fluous suffering is to be detected. Unfor­
tunately, the resulting difference in the way 
cost-benefit analyses are derived is almost 
invariably overlooked. What I want to do now 
is to discuss this difference in approach. In 
the process of so doing, I will suggest that 
another source of disagreement is a differ­
ence about what constitutes the most signifi­
cant human interests. 
The Schweitzer
great humanitarian Albert  
once posed the following as an for

ideal  
science:
 
Those who test operations or drugs on 
animals, or who inoculate them with di­
seases so that they may be able to help 
human beings by means of the results 
thus obtained, ought never to sat­rest 
E6A 11/1 
isfied with the general idea that their 
dreadful doings are performed in pursuit 
of a worthy aim. It is their duty to 
ponder in every separate case whether 
it is really and truly necessary thus to 
sacrifice an animal for humanity.21 
Put in our terms, Schweitzer is suggesting 
that the scientist treat each sacrifice of 
animal interest as analogous to the sacri­
fice of Philo's interests. To do so, the 
scientist must in each case compute animal 
loss and human gain and:-then, weigh the 
respective interests on some system such 
as the c-system. The justified operations 
will be those in which the gain outweighs 
the loss. Let us refer to this ideal as 
"the Schweitzerian ideaL" The Schweitzer­
ian ideal requires a strict comparison of 
interests frustrated and satisfied at an 
individual level. This accords well with 
our feeling that no animal should have to 
suffer without good reason. 
The Schweitzerian ideal embodies a strong
 
concern for animal welfare and it is not un­


usual ideal

to hear scientists citing this  
with approval. However, rarely

scientists  
if ever shape and direct their own work

 
according to Schweitzer­

the dictates of the 
ian ideal. By this I do not mean that

 
scientists cease to be animal

concerned with  
welfare when they actually engage scien­

in 
tific inquiry, as apparent

though their  
acceptance of the Schweitzerian ideal were a
 
matter of hypocrisy. that
My point is simply  
in practice they operate, without
sometimes  
recognizing it, according to of

the dictates  
another ideal, an ideal I will refer to as

 
"the worthy practice ideal." say­
By way of 
ing what this ideal is let me offer an ex­


planation for the general neglect of the

 
ideal.
Schweitzer ian  
Application of the Schweitzerian ideal re­
quires a "cost/benefit" analysis for each 
particular case. It demands, in other ~ords,
that we perceive a direct relation between 
interests frustrated and interests satisfied. 
The problem is that in science as actually 
practiced particular instances of animal suf­
fering rarely coordinate directly with contri­
butions to human welfare. In a recent study 
of alternatives to animal experimentation, 
the British scientist D. H. Smyth argues, 
Attempts to base legislation on such 
issues as whether the experiments are 
directly useful in the alleviation of 
suffering are not likely to be success­
ful. It is impossible dis­to make any 
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medical,
tinction between fundamental,  
research
veterinary and commercial  
which
which could be useful in deciding  
research
particular piece of biomedical  
will contribute to of
the alleviation  
22
suffering.  
Smyth's point is a telling ooe. absence
The  
and
of direct correlations between suffering  
payoff is not happenstance. Rather, stems
it  
from the very nature of science. Scientific

 
inquiry is not a linear process, laid out in

 
advance and checked by a experi­

few crucial 
ments. While science is also not a of
matter  
trial and error, there. is a. of
marked element  
serendipity. Setting this chance
factor of  
in a social endeavor exceeding of

the grasp  
anyone person virtually entails that the im­

pact of many experiments cannot be foreseen.
 
This, unfortunately, is as true animal

for  
experimentation as atom-smashing.

it is for  
The fact that in the former case we are deal­

ing with sentient creatures is, as far as
 
scientific method irrel­
is concerned, simply 
evant. None of this is to deny that good or 
promising experimental design ca,n. be di.stin­
guished from bad. These kinds of decisions 
allow morally sensitive scientists tp week 
out some animal work on the basis of low 
promise. More often, individual cases elude 
assessment on any moral system. The projected 
payoff is too complexly related to the suffer­
ing inflicted to be divided up or anticipated 
in the manner required. 
The worthy practice ideal affirms that sci­
entists should inflict no more suffering than 
is necessary for the pursuit of scientific 
knowledge. Unlike the Schweitzerian ideal, 
which focuses on individual cases, this ideal 
focuses on the general practice of animal ex­
perimentation. According to it, particular 
instances of animal suffering are justified 
if they occur as a consequence of responsible, 
methodologically sound scientific practice. 
If it is then asked why this connection jus­
tifies animal suffering the answer is that 
the general practice of science contributes 
significantly to the alleviation of human 
suffering. Instances of animal suffering 
which result from improper methodology or 
insignificant projects will not be justified 
on the worthy practice idaa1. 
Most scientists, I suggest, operate accord­
ing to the worthy practice and not the 
Schweitzerian ideal. One way to see this is 
to consider the practical consequences of 
each ideal. The worthy practice ideal allows 
for an open-ended justification of animal ex­
perimentation. It says: here is a worthy goa~
13� 
pursue it. Whatever suffering occurs in the 
pursuit of that goal is justified so long as 
the reasonably anticipated benefits are 
sufficiently great. Consequently, it is not 
necessary to show in each individual case 
that animal loss is balanced by human gain; 
only that such loss as does occur occurs in 
the practice of a responsible science. The 
Schweitzerian ideal takes a very different 
approach. To begin, it shifts the burden of 
proof to the scientist with respect to each 
indiVidualvi  case. It is not enough, in other 
words, to show that animal suffering occurs 
in the "pursuit of a worthy aim." "Every 
separate case" must be weighed and whatever 
suffering occurs shown to be compensated for 
by a signif:cantly greater good. Assuming 
that Smyth ~s correct in his claim that at 
present such direct correlations cannot be 
demonstrated for most instances of animal 
research, it follows that the present use 
of animals in science cannot be justified 
on the Schweitzerian ideal. Acceptance of 
that ideal would result in quite significant 
restrictions being placed on the range and ex­
tent of animal experimentation. 
The worthy practice ideal has a strong 
appeal, the basis of which lies in two con­
victions: first, that science is in general 
a worthy activity and, second, that scientific 
progress can be maximized minimiZingby z  non­
methodological restrictions on scientific 
work. The worthy practice ideal is attractive 
because it gives scientists a great deal of 
freedom to pursue as they see best what we 
all see as worthy goals. Anyone who wants to 
reject this ideal in favor of the Schweitzer­
ian ideal will need to show either that ani­
mals deserve more consideration than the 
worthy practice ideal allows and/or that the 
benefits derived from a science operating 
under the worthy practice ideal are not that 
much greater and perhaps even less than those 
derived from a science operating under the 
more restrictive Schweitzerian ideal. Let me 
say a few words about how each line of argu­
ment may be pursued. 
will
Advocates of the Schweitzerian ideal  
want to argue that in the case of animal ex­


perimentation we ought to sacrifice m~thod­
 
ology for morality, that is, that we ought

 
t~ place non-methodological, restric­

moral 
t~ons on what scientists do to animals even

 
when we accept as which

worthy, practices  
might be pursued more without

effectively  
such restrictions. Success regard

in this  
depends upon shOWing that our obliga­

moral 
tions to animals are normally

stronger than  
perceived. If these obligations are strong
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enough, questions about animal experimenta­
tion will parallel those about human experi­
mentation. There is no doubt that we could 
pursue some worthy goals more effectively 
than we do if we gave free rein to the prac­
tice of human experimentation. For instance, 
our understanding of brain disorders could 
be advanced greatly by studying the devel­
opment of children on which we have inflicted 
various kinds of cerebral lesions. Yet, 
despite the worthiness of this end, we do 
not engage in such a practice because we 
quite properly regard it as morally repugnant. 
The animal advocate who pursues this line 
will argue, as many have, that the same con­
siderations which prevent uS from giving 
free rein to the practice of human experi­
mentation ought to prevent us from giving 
free rein to the practice of animal experi­
mentation. 23 
Arguments such as the above are extremely 
important. We cannot get a grip on the moral 
issues without them. One problem with such 
arguments, though, is that taken by themselves 
they may give the impression that the debate 
over animal welfare is entirely a matter of 
weighing animal interests against human inter­
ests. This is a mistake. A large component of 
the debate concerns determining what is in our 
own best interests. If the extensive sacrifice 
of animal interests is not in our own interes~
it will not be justified even on the c-system. 
Acceptance of the worthy practice ideal as a 
justified norm depends upon the presupposition 
that the general practice of animal experimen­
tation is a worthy practice. Although this pre­
supposition is often accepted without pause, 
it strikes me as highly questionable. In a 
moment, I will suggest several reasons for be­
lieving that the general practice of animal 
experimentation is not a worthy practice what­
ever weight we assign animal interests. Prior 
to doing this, however, let me set the stage 
by pointing out three crucial differences be­
tween the individual act and the general prac­
tice of sacrificing animal interests. 
Unlike the Schweitzerian ideal, which assesses 
individual sacrifices of animal interests one 
by one, the worthy practice ideal assesses in­
dividual sacrifices as components of a general 
practice. Ultimately, it is the general prac­
tice which must be justified on the worthy 
practice ideal. In attempting to so justify 
a general practice it is crucial that we avoid 
a common confusion. Attempts to justify the 
general practice of animal experimentation 
often incorporate an emotional appeal to our 
intuitions about particular cases: if you 
were forced to choose between the interests 
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of Philo and Jill, wouldn't you feel morally 
obligated to sacrifice Philo's interests? My 
answer is, "Yes, I would." The act sacrificing 
Philo's interests for the sake of Jill's is 
morally justified. It does not follow from 
this, however, that the general practice of 
sacrificing animal interests is justified. As 
I will now point out, there are important 
differences between the individual act and 
the general practice. 
Consider for a moment, a difference with 
respect to necessity. In the case of Jill 
and Philo the father is forced to make a 
difficult decision by extraordinary circum­
stances; unless he acts his daughter will 
very likely die. In addition to a clearly 
perceived and quite specific connection be­
tween Philo's (possible) loss and Jill's 
(possible) gain, there is an element of real 
necessity. The situation is quite different 
with respect to the general practice of 
animal experimentation. Here, there is no 
parallel to the necessity confronting the 
father. While there is no question that some 
persons will suffer more and die sooner if 
the general practice is terminated, society 
itself would not be placed in any danger. 
There is at present no overwhelming threat 
to the existence or well-being of society 
the staving off of which depends upon the 
general practice of animal experimentation. 
Instead of being forced upon us by an un­
pleasant necessity, animal experimentation is 
pursued as an apparent means to a better life. 
There are other, equally important differ­
ences between the individual case and the gen­
eral practice. One concerns the link between 
suffering and payoff. There is a good chance 
that much suffering incurred in the general 
course of research will never result in the 
alleviation of either human or animal suffer­
ing. Unlike those individual cases where 
there is a direct connection between suffer­
ing and payoff, benefits derived from scien­
tific research follow a circuitous route. In 
some cases, knowledge gained may never "pay 
off" due to a lack of technology or will. On 
the darker side, there is every reason to be­
lieve knowledge gained has and will be used 
by some humans to violate the basic and ser­
ious interests of other humans; governments 
are not loving fathers. 
Another difference has to do with the ex­
tent of animal suffering. Unlike the Jill/ 
Philo case, there is no limit to the extent 
of animal suffering which may be brought 
about by the general practice of animal ex­
perimentation. In the latter case, as opposed 
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to the former, we have an ,open-ended or "blank­
check" justification. Given that we are un­
likely to resolve all medical problems con­
fronting us, there will always be more method­
ologically sound experiments which may result 
in beneficial knowledge. By linking the prac­
tice of animal experimentation to such vaguely 
apprehended promises rather than directly per­
ceived necessities, an open-ended justifica­
tion is provided for the sacrifice not of one, 
tWO, or even hundreds but quite literally for 
that of many billions. 
The general practice of animal experimenta­
tion involves much more than and cannot be 
justified in the same terms as the sacrifice 
of Philo's interests for Jill's. Crucial 
differences with respect to necessity, payoff, 
and extent of suffering drive a wedge between 
our intuitions regarding particular cases and 
our judgment about general practices. In the 
latter case we must ask not only whether ani­
mal interests should ever be sacrificed for 
human interests--that is clear--but also whe­
ther benefits derived from the general 
practice outweigh losses resulting therefrom. 
In raising this question I want to put aside 
consideration of the extensive losses animals 
suffer. Let us assume that animal interests 
count for very little and ask, given this 
assumption, whether the general practice of 
methodologically-unrestricted animal experi­
mentation is in the best interests of human 
society. 
In a paper describing some of the benefits 
derived from animal experimentation, Orland 
Soave concludes, 
Animal research constitutes one of 
the primary reasons for the high stand­
ard of living and health enjoyed today 
by citizens of the United States. 24 
If correct, Soave's claim provides strong 
support for the belief that animal experimen­
tation is a worthy practice. It is, of course, 
undeniable that the practice of animal experi­
mentation has resulted in a number of contri­
butions to human (and animal) welfare. Insulin, 
open-heart surgery, the control of infection, 
the development of powerful anesthetics and 
other wonder-drugs are only some of the bene­
fits derived from or in conjunction with ani­
mal experimentation. These and other contri­
butions, striking as they are, have led many 
persons and especially scientists to conclude 
with Soave that human society has a great 
stake in animal experimentation. Despite its 
surface appeal, such a claim is mistaken. Not 
only is it not the case that present standards 
of living and health are dependent on the gen-
IS 
eral practice of animal experimentation, it is 
also the case that that practice for various 
reasons decreases the value of life in any 
society wherein it occurs. 
By way of assessing Soave's claim we must 
once again avoid confusing the particular and 
the general. It does not follow from the 
fact that particular individuals have profited 
from animal research that society as a whole 
has profited from such work. While it is clear 
that some individuals have profited greatly 
from the practice of animal experimentation, 
there is good reason to believe that present 
standards of living and health are not a con­
seqUiance of nor dependent upon that practice. 
The major contributions~f animal experimenta­
tion to health lie in the area of recovery 
from illness. The major determinates of 
health, however, lie in the area of prevention. 
A thorough study of documentary evidence re­
garding causes of death in England and Wales 
during the past three centuries led Thomas 
McKeown to the fol~owing conclusion, 
The appraisal of influences health
on  
suggested
in the past three centuries  
that we owe the improvement, not to

 
what happens when we are ill, but to

 
the fact that we do not so be­

often 
come ill; and we remain well, be­

not 
cause of specific measures such as

 
vaccination and immunization, be­

but 
cause we enjoy a of

higher standard  
nutrition and live in a healthier

 
ellvironment . 25
 

McKeown reaches the follOWing conclusion re­

research
garding the contribution of medical  
to health,

improved  
The direction of medical research has 
been determined by the belief thac im­
provement in health depends essentially 
on knowledge of the body and its diseases, 
applied mainly through personal medical 
intervention in the form of immunization 
and therapy ... (T)his interpretation is 
not in accord with past experience: the 
modern improvement in health wa's initiated 
and carried quite a long way with little 
assistance from science and technology .... 
26 
Is MeKeown right? This is a difficult and im­
portant question into which we can go no fur­
ther here. 27 McKeown's research is of such a 
quality as to indicate that claims about the 
indispensability of animal research to public 
health are highly suspect. 28 While McKeown 
himself favors increased medical research, he 
observes that "in advanced countries health 
is still determined mainly by personal be­
havior and the environment.,,29 
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If animal research does not make an impor­
tant and indispensable contribution to public 
health, questions must also be raised about 
its economic feasibility. Animal research 
is expensive and as such places strain on an 
already overstrained national budget. 30 Per­
haps money used in support of animal research 
could be better used elsewhere. Rather than 
pursue this line of criticism, however, I want 
to turn the discussion in another direction. 
I have suggested that the general practice of 
animal experimentation does not make a signi­
ficant contribution to public health. I want 
now to argue that in various ways that prac­
tice undermines the value of life in modern 
society. The charges I will make are contro­
versial not least because they have to do with 
·.rh.at might be called "intangible factors." 
How one views them will depend in large measure 
on how one views human life. At they
bottom  
have consti­

to do with questions about what 
tutes a truly "good life"31 and as such are

 
liable to lively debate. Nevertheless, they

 
are important and we overlook them at our own

 
peril.
 
Richard Ryder has argued in his book, Victims 
of Science, that the most horrible feature of 
animal experimentation as presently practiced 
is its "terrible ordinariness."32 What in the 
case of Jill and Philo is a tragedy, forced on 
the father by extraordinary circumstances, be­
comes in science a way of life. In the process 
animals utilized cease to be seen as creatures 
....ith lives and purposes of their own and become 
instead "animal tools," instruments for the 
purpose of man. That such de-sensitization 
occurs is quite plausible on general psycho­
logical grounds. The routine infliction of 
misery exerts a strong pressure toward desen­
sitization. Evidence that such desensitization 
occurs can be found in the terminology used 
when speaking of animals, the range of uses 
to which animals are put, the minimal condi­
tions under which animals are kept and the 
growth of an "animal industry" promoting the 
use of animals. 33 All of this, of course, is 
not to deny that individual scientists may be 
very sensitive to the horrors of animal suf­
fering. Some scientists, of whom I have been 
fortunate to meet mo~e than a few, care enough 
that they refuse to participate in practices 
common to others. The problem I want to note 
here is not one of individual cruelty but 
rather that posed by an institutionalized 
thoughtlessness, a widespread and socially con­
doned failure to realize just what it is that 
is being done. The mere fact that so many de­
fenders of animal experimentation regard cri­
tics thereof as overly-emotional sentimentalists 
is itself an indication that desensitization 
has occurred. 
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Desensitization to animal sufferipg is in it­
self a terrible thing. R.D.Laing has rightly 
observed, "We become less human to the extent 
that we treat any living beings as things."34 
Another related concern has to do with the long­
term effects of desensitization. the English 
philosopher John Locke once argued that we 
should discourage cruelty in children on the 
grounds that lithe custom of tormenting and kill­
ing beasts, will, by degrees, harden their minds 
even towards men." 35 If Locke is correct there 
is clearly a danger that desensitization con­
cenring animal suffering will result in desensi­
tization concerning human suffering. While I 
suspect there is something to this correlation 
1 am not prepared to affirm it. One reason is 
that Locke overlooks the extent to which human 
beings are capable of arbitrarily restricting 
their sphere of concern: the fact, if it were 
a fact, that I am not disturbed by black men 
dying in the streets of South Africa does not 
show that I am not seriously concerned with 
the sufferings of friends and neighbors; a 
society which routinely inflicts pain on ani­
mals (or barbarians, for that matter) may 
strenuously resist harming any person who is 
a member of that society. However, while 
this capacity to draw arbitrary distinctions 
protects the general practice of animal ex­
perimentation from what we might call "Locke's 
objection," it opens it up to another, more 
serious objection. C. S. Lewis put the prob­
lem this way: 
Once the old Christian idea of a total 
difference in kind between man and beast 
has been abandoned, then no argument for 
experiments on animals can be found which 
is not also an argument for experiments
36on inferior men. 
Given the discovery that some animals not only 
construct tools but also have highly developed 
systems of communication, Lewis' point is not 
a trivial one. If Washoe and her relatives 
have greater psychological capacities than 
severely retarded humans, why should we in­
flict terrible suffering on chimpanzees but 
not on less capable humans? According to the 
c-system one is morally obligated to give 
preference to more highly developed creatures. 
My point is not to advocate using retarded 
persons in research. It is simply that a so­
ciety which inflicts extreme suffering on 
higher animals ought to have good reasons 
for not inflicting it on "lower humans." If 
they don't, that society ceases to be a ra­
tional society and I, for one, regard that 
as most undesirable. If Lewis' point is to 
be set aside, we need some good, morally 
relevant reasons for treating all animals 
differently than !ll humans. To my knowl­
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edge, the defenders of animal experimenta­

tion have yet to come such

up with any  
reasons.
 
Another concern has to do with the desir­
ability of life in a society which routinely 
sacrifices animal interests. By way of mak­
ing this point, let me step back a moment 
from questions of right and wrong and call 
attention to just how sad it is that so many 
animals live such horrible lives. In order 
to do so let me make reference to an intrig­
uing little story by Desmond Stewart. 37 I n 
this story the earth is invaded and conquer­
ed bv an alien race, the Troogs. The Troogs 
proc~ed to treat humans no better .nor worse 
than we have treated the animals. In this 
they feel completely justified since they 
are without doubt vastly superior to human
 
beings. Yet unquestioned

for all their  
superiority we cannot help but feel that

 
the Troogs are lacking something, some

 
basic trait which would raise above

them  
the brutal level at which they act. We

 
might even be tempted to trait

call the  
they lack 'humanity,' humane­
that is, 
ness, sympathy,

the having of compassion,  
creatures.
and consideration for other  
Whether or not the Troogs jus­
are morally 
tified in what they do, we be­

fee! it is 
neath their dignity as creatures

superior  
to so callously and routinely use inferior
 
creatures for their own 38

purposes.  
Finally, we must reckon with the possi­
bility that in pursuing benefits to be 
gained from animal experimentation we are, 
almost paradoxically, cutting ourselves 
off from a deeper source of happiness. In 
the final analysis, human happiness does 
not stem from a longer life or even good 
health but from the sense of a life well 
lived. Even if the practice of animal ex­
perimentation makes a significant contri­
bution to longer life or better health-­
something which I doubt--we still must ask 
whether in so doing it contributes to human 
happiness. My own conviction is that on the 
whole it does not. An integral part of a 
truly good life is a sense of having contri­
buted to the well-being of others. In this 
respect, the wise person Willingly sacrifices 
elements of his/her well-being for the well­
being of others. A life built around the 
suffering of others can only be happy in the 
most restricted of senses. Correspondingly, 
a society which promotes the welfare of a 
few at the cost of inflicting on all respon­
sibility for the massive suffering of animals 
is not a desirable society from the stand­
point of human happiness. The person who 
•
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doubts this need only ask whether increased 
health and life-span, whatever their source, 
have resulted in increased happiness. So 
far as I can see, they have not. 39 
This completes my discussion of reasons for 
believing that the general practice of animal 
experimentation is not a worthy practice. To­
gether they suggest that not only is that 
practice not necessary for human health or 
survival but further, that it has a baneful 
effect on the overall well-being of society. 
If successful, these reasons indicate that 
present scientific practices involving animal 
suffering cannot be justified even on the c­
system. This conclusion, I note, is not a con­
sequence of assigning greater weight to ani­
mal interests but of asking seriously whether 
the institution in question is in the best 
interests of human society. One nice effect 
of this approach is that the issue of animal 
welfare becomes part and parcel of a larger 
issue concerning the nature and goals of 
social organization: what constitutes a truly 
good life for humans and how should society 
be structured so as to allow maximal realiza­
tion of that life. 40 Reflection on the moral 
status of animals will not resolve that issue. 
Until it is dealt with, however, we cannot say 
whether the general practice of animal experi­
mentation is in the best interests of (normal) 
human beings. 41 
III 
Historically, human uniqueness has been 
taken to justify exploitation of animals. 42 
We have just seen reason to question any such 
attempt. Even if animal life and suffering 
is inconsequential compared to ours, it does 
not follow that animals exist only for us, 
not for themselves. It may be that what makes 
us unique--what raises us so far above the 
level of brutes--is a capacity to appreciate 
the value each sentient creature's life has 
for it itself. Our examination of the c­
system, a minimal morality according high 
priority to human interests, suggests that 
granting any value to animal well-being places 
serious limitations on the human use of ani­
Our own unique life as moral and rational 
agents picks up this value, incorporates it 
into our own quest for fulfillment and, there­
by, multiplies its significance. 
Advocates of animal welfare have no intrin­
sic reason for fearing human uniqueness. As 
long as uniqueness is l'inked to responsibility 
as well as privilege it provides a buffer for 
animal interests. We have seen this to be the 
case with the c-system. Granting humans the 
privilege of violating animal interests for 
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the sake of their own interests provides no 
license for excess once it is realized that 
human interests are tied to animal welfare. 
That human interests are so tied follows from 
the vary uniqueness of humans. Given this, 
though, we need not give up the quest for a 
stronger system than the c-system. One weak­
ness in the above line of argument is that it 
trades too heavily on human interests: it 
sounds as though treating animals well is not 
something that should be done for its own 
sake·. This is a just criticism. Although the 
c-system does accord moral standing to animals, 
that standing is so low as to require multi~
plication by human interest to protact animal 
~elfare~ Whatever the status of the c-system, 
however, the accessibility of such reenforce­
ment is itself heartening. 
Richard L. Fern 
University of Illinois 
at Urbana-Champaign 
II use the term 'animal' as short for 'non­
human animal.' Earlier versions of this pa­
per ~ere given at the Conference on Medicine 
. ' An~mals and Man held at the University of 
Illinois Medical Center (Chicago Circle), 
Lake Forest College, the University of Ill­
inois (Urbana) and Yale University. The paper 
~hich now appears is both clearer and stronger 
as a result of ensuing discussion. Special 
thanks are due Charlotte Brown, David Keppler, 
Paul Langner, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Sally Moran, 
Mary Morgan, Mike Nelson, Don Scheid and Jim 
Wallace.�
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e restr~ct~on on t e absolutism of man's 
rule over Nature is now generally accepted; 
moral philosophers and public opinion agree 
that it is morally impermissible to be cruel 
to animals. And by this they mean... that it 
is wrong to cause them to suffer unnecessar­
ily." John Passmore, "The Treatment of Ani­
mals," Journal of the Historv of Ideas, XXXVI 
(1975), p.195. Moral philosophers, of course, 
differ as to whether our moral responsibility 
to animals is direct or indirect. For more on 
this issue, see Tom Regan's introduction to 
Animal Rights and Human Obligations, ed. by 
Rom Regan and Peter Singer (Prentice-Hall, 
1976) . 
3"The humanity which would prevent human 
suffering is a deeper and truer humanity than 
the humanity which would save pain or death 
in the animal." Charles Eliot. Quoted in 
Robert J. White, "Antivivisection: The Reluc­
tant Hydra," The American Scholar, vol. 40 
(1971); reprinted in Regan and Singer pp. 
163-169. ' 
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4Donald VanDeVeer, "Interspecific Justice," 
Inouiry, vol.22 (1979), p. 58. 
SLawrence Haworth argues not only that ani­
mals have rights but that these tights are 
extremely weak and easily overridden by human 
interests. Cf. "Rights, Wrongs and Animals," 
Ethics, vol. 88 (1978). 
6For discussion of much of this research, 
see Edmund Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Syn­
thesis (Harvard, 1975). Wilson's book con­
tains an extensive bibliography. 
7For example, Donald Griffin, The Question 
of Animal Awareness (Rockefeller University 
Press, 1976). 
8VanDeVeer. 
9Robert Nozick makes a similar suggestion 
in Anarchy, State and Uto~ia (Basic, 1974), 
p. 40. 
lOCf. VanDeVeer, pp. 74ff, for a discussion 
of several objections to two-factor egalitar­
ianism. 
11H. J. McCloskey has argued that only beings 
who ought to be concerned about their interests 
have interests. If this were so, it follows 
that animals, of whom it cannot be said that 
they ought to do anything, do not have inter­
ests. Tom Regan has replied, correctly I  be­
lieve, that while interests are the sorts of 
things moral agents ought to be concerned about, 
it is not true that only moral agents have 
interests. Here, as elsewhere, Regan draws 
parallels between the status of animals and 
"marginal humans" such as infants and sever1y 
retarded persons. Cf. McCloskey, "Rights," 
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 15 (1965) and 
Regan, Philosophical Quarterlv, vol 26 (1979), 
pp. 251-7. 
12Cf. Wilson. Also, George Schaller, ~
Mountain Gorilla (University of Chicago, 1963); 
L. David Mech, The Wolf (Natural History Press, 
1970), and Jane van Lawick-Goodall, In the 
Shadow of Man (Houghton Mifflin, 1971). 
13VanDeVeer also distinguishes between basic, 
serious and peripheral interests; his distinc­
tions are somewhat different from mine. 
l4 It does not follow, of course, all �that  
social animals have a marked capacity to learn� 
experience.�from  
lSJames Rachels develops the notion of "hav­
ing a life in a biographical sense" in a talk, 
"Do Animals Have a Right to Life?" given at 
the 1979 Blacksburg conference on Ethics and 
Animals, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University. 
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16Cf. Nozick, p. 42; also, VanDeVeer, p.70. 
The justification of this principle lies at 
the heart of tyo-factor egalitarianism. 
17Given that various humans, present and fu­
ture, have interests in keeping (some) animals 
alive, the Bl-principle will not justify whole­
sale slaughter of animals. 
leA similar claim is made by Peter Singer, 
Animal Liberation (Avon, 1975), p.6 and p.22; 
also, VanDeVeer, pp. 70f. 
19For examples of such suffering, see Singer; 
also Richard Ryder, Victims of Science (London, 
1975) and Jeff Diner, Phvsical and Mental Suf­
fering of Experimental Animals (Animal Welfare 
Institute, 1979). 
20Excellent work has been done in this regard 
by the Scientists' Center for Animal Welfare. 
For some suggestions as to how suffering may be 
reduced see Russell and Burch's discussion of 
the three "r's"--reduction, refinement and re­
placement--in W.M.S.Russell and R.L.Burch, The 
Principles of Humane Experimental Technique 
(Methuen, 1959). 
2lAlbert Schweitzer, "The Ethic of Reverence 
for Life," reprinted in Regan and Singer, p.137. 
22D. H. Smyth, Alternatives to Animal Experi­
mentation (Scholars Press in association with 
the Research Defense Society, 1978), p. 167. 
23Recent1y, Tom Regan, James Rachels, Joel 
Feinberg and others have followed Henry Salt 
(Animal Rights, MacMillan, 1894) in arguing that 
if humans have rights, so do animals. Each ar­
gues that if all humans have moral rights then, 
"iven the existence of so-called "marginal hu­
:ans" there are no good reasons for claiming 
that only humans have moral rights. Presenta­
tions~these arguments can be found in the 
Regan/Singer anthology. A recent attempt at 
rebuttal can be found in R.G.Frey's book, In­
terests and Ri~hts: the Case A~ainst Animals 
(Oxford, 1980). Other writers, for whom the 
notion of moral rights has little appeal, have 
argued in a similar manner from different bases. 
In his book, The Moral Status of Animals (Ox­
ford, 1977), Stephen Clark argues in a Humean 
vein that the moral sentiment applies to both 
humans and animals. A much better known argu­
ment is th~t of Peter Singer. Singer has argu­
ed along classical utilitarian lines that the 
only reason we feel justified in giving free 
rein to the practice of animal experimentation 
is that we arbitrarily choose to regard animal 
suffering as less important than human suffer­
ing. This view, which Singer (following Ryder) 
19 
has labeled "speciesism," is argued by him to 
be a bare prejudice, a flat violation of the 
basic moral principle that equal amounts of 
suffering are equally bad regardless of who or 
what is the subject of such suffering. 
24American Journal of Public Health, vol.57, 
no. 9, September, 1967; p. 1626. Published as 
one of 4 articles jointly titled "Vivisection-­
Vivistudv: The Facts and the Benefits to Animal 
and Huma~ Health." Reprints of these articles 
are available from The National Society for 
Medical Research. 
25Thomas McKeown, The Role of Medicine: Dream, 
Mirage or Nemesis? Princeton University Press, 
1979, p.79. McKeown is Emeritus Professor of 
Social Medicine at the University of Birming­
ham. 
2EoMcKeown, p .10. 
270ne area in which animal research has bear­
ing on the prevention of disease is that of nu­
trition. I Since it might be felt that such re­
search vitiates the ne~ative implications of 
McKeown's work, I include the following comment: 
The first and most important reason for
 
the decline of infectious diseases was

 
an improvement in nutrition. resulted

It  
from advances spread
in agriculture which  
throughout the western world about

from  
the end of the seventeenth century. Al­


though incidental to our theme, of

it is  
great interest that the advance was due

 
initially to the introduction of new

 
crops such as the potato and maize, and

 
to more tradi­

effective application of 
use,
tional methods--increased land  
manuring, winter feeding, of

rotation  
crops, etc.--rather than mechanical

to  
or in­

chemical methods associated with 
dustrialization." p.7S)

(McKeown,  
It is also worth noting in light of recent con­
troversies that extensive research has not led 
to agreement regarding acceptable levels of 
cholesteroL 
28In pressing this question, it should not 
be forgotten that numerous persons have, as a 
consequence of medical innovations, suffered 
more than they would have otherwise. This in­
cludes persons undergoing unnecessary and/or 
unsuccessful operations as well as term1nally 
ill patients who are forced often against 
their will to continue a life full of pain. 
A useful discussion of some of these problems 
relative to coronary bypass surgery can be 
found in The New York Times, November 18, 1980, 
p. l5f. Not only does this article suggest 
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that bypass surgery is a "mixed blessing," it 
also indicates that reduction of risk factors 
such as hyper­cigarette smoking, hypertension, 
cholesteremia, obesity and sedentary living
makes a far greater contribution to elimin­the 
ation of atherosclerosis. 
29McKeown. p. 9. 
30According to the National Institute of 
Heal th Publication No. 80-2091, approximately 
$800 million was spent on lab­research using 
oratory animals by nonprofit organizations in 
1978 alone. Of this amount, a larger percentage 
~as paid for through grants and contracts from 
NIH. The amount spent is not going down. re­A 
cent article in The New York Times of December 
7, 1980, estimates that it will cost as much 
as 3 billion dollars just to ex­test presently 
isting chemicals as Sub­required by the Toxic 
stances Control Act of 1976. While such. work 
may be methodologically sound, one wonders 
whether the economy would be better off if less 
expensive alternatives were pursued. In a recent 
. .letter to The Beast, Andrew Rowan of Insti­the 
tute for the Study of Animal Problems and a 
noted authority on the topic of "alternatives," 
claims, "perhaps 50% of all animals used in 
sa fety evaluation and toxicity testing could be 
stopped immediately without jeopardizing human 
health or safety." (The Beast, no. 8, Winter 
1980-81; p. 56.) 
•J1r use 'gOOd' here in a non-moral sense. 
32Ryder, Victims of Science, p. 18. 
33 .. . 
A recent art~cle ~n The New York Times (De­
. " 
on Regu1at~on, gave teo oWlng ~gures or 
sales and profits of two companies supplying 
, . an~mals for research: Charles River Breed~ng
T ., '. $ LaDorator~es sold 18 mill~on animals for 30 
. . . .. mlll~on and a proflt of $3 m~llion; Hazelton$43 2 " h· fT torles••d~d . m~lll.on wort 0 busi­,--abara a  2" .f . ness for a pro It of $ m~ll~on. F~gures are 
f h d' J 30 1980 
_or t e year en ~ng une,. 
3~R. D. Laing. Quoated in Stanley Godlovitch, 
\1"Ur:ilities, Godlovitch and Harris, p. 173. An 
insightful albeit controversial analysis of 
?roblems associated with desensitization can be 
found Physical­in T.L.S.Sprigge, "Metaphysics, 
ism and Animal Rights," Inquirv, vol. 22, nos. 
1-2, pp. 101-43. 
~.~:>Quoted in Robert S. Brumbaugh, "Of Man, 
Animals, and Morals: A Brief History," On the 
Fifth Dav: Animal Rights and Human Ethics, ed. 
by Richard Knowles Martin and Michael W. Fox 
(Acropolis Books. 1978)_ p. 17. 
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36C.S.Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays on Theol­
ogy and Ethics, ed. by Walter Hooper. W. B. 
Eerdmans, 1970, p. 227. 
37Desmond Stewart. "The Limits of Trooghaft." 
Encounter (London, February, 1972). Reprinted 
in Regan and Singer, pp. 238-45. 
38T.L.S.Sprigge has raised a question as to 
whether truly enlightened people would even want 
to survive "at the cost of massive suffering to 
other sentient creatures." Sprigge. p. 130. 
After reflecting on this question, proceed to 
reflect on how little our own well-being, let 
alone survival, depends on the massive suffer­
ing we inflict on animals. 
39"'What is man 'Without the beasts? If all 
the beasts were gone, man would die from great 
loneliness of spirit, for whatever happens to 
the beasts also happens to man. All things are 
connected." Remark attributed to the Suquamish 
Indian Chief Seatlh 1855. Cited in National 
Geoiraohic, vol. 159. no. 2, p. 159. 
~ONumerous persons, including Lawrence Haworth 
(Haworth. p.109), Philip Devine ("The Moral 
Basis of Vegetarianism," Philosophy, vol. 53 
(1978), p.493), and Maurice Visscher (Journal of 
the American Medican Association, vol. 199 , no. 
9 (1967), p.129) have suggested that concern 
for animal welfare takes the place of concern 
for human welfare. While this may be true for 
some, there is no necessary trade-off. Indeed, 
the two concerns have comeoften CO  together. 
According to Passmore, "The attack on slavery, 
a t the hands of evangelicals and of Bentham, 
ran hand in h d 'th h k 1
- - an Wl t e attac on crue ty to 
cember 7 , :980~, ent~tlhedf Allco~panYf.that ThfriVeSanimals," (Passmore, p.2l7). Animal welfare 
advocates h t d d 1 k h d h 
abuse of an~vel en e tio over oOi ow deep t e 
~ma s runs n our soc ety an , con­
sequentl h f '1 d h 1 d' 1y, ave al e to see ow tru y ra ~ca
their ro os 1 . l' , 1 d . 1p pas are l.n a po ~tlca an soc~a
sense For s l' ht' . k . h' 
. ome en ~g en~ng remar s ~n t ~s
regard s C 1 t D 11 "Th' k' d B 
, ee ar e on a ery, ~n ~ng an e­ing with Beasts" 0 th ~'f h D d b
' n e r 1 t ax, e. yRichard Morris and Michael W. Fox (Acropolis 
Books, 1978), esp. p.87. My own belief is that 
significant improvements in animal welfare will 
only come about through the development of more 
equitable social systems. Animals occupy a spe­
cial place in such change simply because they 
are politically helpless. When animals are 
treated fairly, it will be a princi­matter of 
ple, not of expediency. 
~lIt appears then, that in the final analysis 
some conflicts between interests can' only be 
resolved by appeal to non-moral values. For a 
careful and enlightening discussion of such 
appeals relative to moral consistency, see Ruth 
Barcan Marcus, "Moral Dilemmas and Consistency," 
Journal of PhilosophY, vol.77 (1980). 
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4Z"Brutes are as things in our regard: so far 
as they are useful to us, they exist for us, 
not for themselves; and we do right in using 
them unsparingly for our need and convenience, 
thought not for our wantonness." Father Joseph 
Rickaby, Philosoohy re­-Moral 10 (1901); extract 
printed in Regan and Singer, p. 180. 
